goals and roadmap
plans, not promises. dates and scope will move as the measurements come in.
- hide who talks to whom
- not only what is said. the relay chain, fixed-size cells and node clocks target the metadata that encryption leaves in the open.
- prove it with numbers
- every protection ships with the attack against it and a measured price in bandwidth and latency.
- keep keys out of reach
- key material lives in locked memory, is zeroed after use, and never touches a disk.
- stay open
- the system, the attack and the harness are public under agpl-3.0, so anyone can rerun the figures.
thesis
the system and its measurements.
- three-relay chain, nested layers, fixed-size cells
- keys in locked memory, nothing on disk
- own traffic correlation attack as a measuring tool
- x25519 suite by default, gost suite behind the same interface
- next: authenticated node keys for the client
alpha
a client people can hold.
- mobile and desktop client over the same go core
- authenticated key distribution for nodes
- forward secrecy for circuit layers
- the app screens shown on this site, made real
research in japan
a master's programme, and study for the product.
- one research contribution on metadata protection
- trust split across relays with independent operators
- hardened node systems, confidential computing later
- publication at security venues
product
open core, relays that forget.
- open core under agpl, relays kept in ram only
- pluggable transports from the client to the entry node
- modern link handshake with pinned keys, fixed frames kept
- public beta, then an independent audit of a frozen version